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Source:  Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 1.

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 4.

(1952) Equal protection provision does not require change of venue or right to disqualify judge in a criminal contempt case. Osborne v. Purdome (Mo.), 250 S.W.2d 159.

(1955) Section 556.285 which makes person convicted more than three times of larceny guilty of grand larceny on conviction of a subsequent larceny held valid against challenger based on the due process, equal protection and ex post facto provisions of the constitution. State v. King (Mo.), 275 S.W.2d 310.

(1960) Act providing for the licensing of persons engaging in the business of selling checks, drafts and money orders but excluding persons the major portion of whose business consisted of sale of merchandise, held to be arbitrary and a special law and therefore void under the federal and state constitutional provisions. Petit v. Field (Mo.), 341 S.W.2d 106.

(1962) Act prohibiting discriminatory practices in the sale of milk and prohibiting its sale at less than cost held not violative of the equal rights and due process provisions of the constitution. Borden Company v. Thomason (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 735.

(1962) Statute dividing state into congressional districts upheld against charge that because of the unequal apportionment the influence of individual's vote was not equal to that of voters in other districts, thus depriving him of equal protection of laws. Preisler v. Hearnes (Mo.), 362 S.W.2d 552.

(1964) Sunday sales law upheld against charge that it was unconstitutional as being a special law, containing unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory classifications in violation of plaintiff's right to equal rights and opportunities under the law; and depriving plaintiffs of liberty and property without due process of law. GEM Stores Inc. v. O'Brien (Mo.), 374 S.W.2d 109.

(1964) Where taxable property lying within the boundaries of a county library district was incorporated by annexation into the boundaries of a city which had a tax supported free public library, held that the property was subject to the taxing power of both districts and such interpretation did not violate Article X, § 3, and Article I, §§ 2, 10, 26 and 28 of Missouri Constitution, St. Louis County Library District v. Hopkins (Mo.), 375 S.W.2d 71.

(1964) Picketing of funeral home which was in part for the purpose of preventing owners from personally doing any embalming in their own business was for an unlawful purpose. Baue v. Embalmers Federal Labor Union No. 21301 (Mo.), 376 S.W.2d 230.

(1964) Validity of city ordinance requiring licensing of television and radio servicemen upheld against charges that it violated due process and equal protection clauses of state and federal constitutions and the "special law" prohibition of the state constitution. McClellan v. Kansas City (Mo.), 379 S.W.2d 500.

(1964) Failure to furnish defendant in prosecution for first degree robbery with free depositions was not a violation of his constitutional rights. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.

(1974) Held that classification of marijuana with more dangerous drugs is not violative of equal protection or due process. State v. Burrow (Mo.), 514 S.W.2d 585.

(1978) Provision that all persons shall have "the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry" does not prohibit inclusion of compulsory union membership provision in collective bargaining agreement. Independent Stave Company v. Higdon (Mo.), 572 S.W.2d 424.

(1990) Where retirement benefits from private nongovernmental employment were subject to income tax and retirement benefits from governmental employment was exempt, tax scheme did not violate principles of equal protection; the legislature's classification of governmental and nongovernmental employees' retirement benefits has a rational basis. Schnorbus v. Director of Revenue, 790 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. banc).

(1994) Section 36.150, RSMo, does not violate constitution, where state had legitimate interest in maintaining public confidence in impartial civil service by prohibiting merit employees from being candidates for any partisan political office. Asher v. Lombardi, 877 S.W.2d 628 (Mo. banc).

(2021)  House Bill 1413 enacted in 2018 held to violate section guaranteeing equal protection; bill's exemption of public safety labor organizations lacked rational basis by treating similarly situated labor organizations differently.  Missouri National Education Association v. Missouri Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, 623 S.W3d 585 (Mo.banc).

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 2.

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 3.

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 5 (Amended August 7, 2012).

(1953) Evidence reviewed and held to establish that schools taught by nuns of religious order were not in fact free public schools and therefore not entitled to support from public funds. Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8, 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W.2d 573.

(1973) Payment of taxes by parent who sends his children to religiously oriented schools does not interfere with his constitutional right to select such a school for his children. McDonough v. Aylward (Mo.), 500 S.W.2d 721.

(1976) Denial to members of a religious society of whom only one was a priest and the others were laymen who did not have the religious ministry as a primary and regular vocation, of an occupancy permit to occupy an existing residence as their home in an area zoned single family residential was not a denial of their constitutional rights under the freedom-of-worship and due process clauses of the Missouri Constitution. Association for Educational Development v. Hayward (Mo.), 533 S.W.2d 579.

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 6.

(1974) Held, that portion of § 170.051 requiring public school boards to provide textbooks to teachers in private schools violates Art. I, § 6, of the const. of Mo. which prohibits the "support" of any "teacher of any sect". The provision requiring textbooks to be provided to pupils attending private schools violates Art. IX, § 8, of the const. of Mo. which prohibits payment from a public fund in aid of any religious creed, church or sectarian purpose. Paster v. Tussey (Mo.), 512 S.W.2d 97.

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 7.

(1961) Where property acquired by land clearance for redevelopment authority of city was conveyed to university controlled by religious denomination pursuant to a plan adopted by the city in slum clearance project, and where the only bid received was from the university, there was no subsidy of religion from public funds in the absence of showing of fraud or arbitrary action. Kintzele v. City of St. Louis (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 695.

(1973) The provisions of the state constitution not withstanding, educationally deprived children attending nonpublic schools are entitled to receive allocation of federal funds for programs of special services comparable in quality, scope and opportunity to children in public schools. Barrera v. Wheeler (CA Mo.), 475 F.2d 1338.

(1974) Held, that portion of § 170.051 requiring public school boards to provide textbooks to teachers in private schools violates Art. I, § 6, of the const. of Mo. which prohibits the "support" of any "teacher of any sect". The provision requiring textbooks to be provided to pupils attending private schools violates Art. IX, § 8, of the const. of Mo. which prohibits payment from a public fund in aid of any religious creed, church or sectarian purpose. Paster v. Tussey (M0.), 512 S.W.2d 97.

(1978) Held, that no judicial officer may determine child custody, based on approval or disapproval of the beliefs, doctrines or tenets of the religion of either parent or their interpretation thereof. Waits v. Waits (Mo.), 567 S.W.2d 326.

(2017) A Missouri department program that denied a government grant to a religious school solely because of its religious character, while providing grants to similarly situated nonreligious groups, violated the freedom of religion guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. 449 (2017).

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 14.

(1951) Where employees at election under federal law had rejected union as their representative, picketing of employer for purpose of coercing employer to recognize such union was unlawful and consequently not within protection of free speech provisions. Kincaid-Webber Motor Co. v. Quinn, 362 Mo. 375, 241 S.W.2d 886.

(1952) Picketing, for the purpose of coercing employer to sign contract recognizing as exclusive collective bargaining agent a labor organization of which only small minority of employees of such employer were members, was for an unlawful purpose under federal statute and therefore could be restrained without violating free speech guarantees of constitution. Katz Drug Co. v. Kavner (Mo.), 249 S.W.2d 166.

(1955) Petition in libel action is subject to motion to dismiss but the function of the court is limited to a determination of whether the alleged libelous matter set forth in petition is capable of defamatory meaning. Coots v. Payton, 365 Mo. 180, 280 S.W.2d 47.

(1955) Where evidence disclosed no reasonable objective of peaceful picketing other than to cause the employer to violate its employees' rights by coercing them into union membership it was unlawful and would be enjoined. Bellerive Country Club v. McVey, 365 Mo. 477, 284 S.W.2d 492.

(1956) Where one union was certified by federal authorities as bargaining representative of employees, another union, its officers and a newspaper publisher, who circulated pamphlets stating that members of the second union were not employed by the employer and urging the public not to purchase the employer's products for the purpose of preventing the sale of such products were engaging in an unlawful boycott and such circulation may be enjoined. Adams Dairy, Inc. v. Burke (Mo.), 293 S.W.2d 281.

(1961) City ordinance denouncing the offense of selling, attempting to sell, or possessing with the intent to sell, obscene literature held unconstitutional because it did not require proof of knowledge of the person so possessing or selling such matter as an element of the offense. City of St. Louis v. Williams (Mo.), 343 S.W.2d 16. Reversed, 367 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 1708. (See also Mo. L. Rev., Vol. XXVI, p. 501 for note.)

(1964) It is proper for the court to instruct the jury to the general effect that even though the court has instructed them on the question of libel or no libel the constitution gives them the right to determine the law and the facts on that issue. Dyer v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co. (Mo.), 378 S.W.2d 570.

(1969) Public employer could not lay off or reduce pay of municipal employees to intimidate them for joining labor organization. State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool (Mo.), 441 S.W.2d 35.

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 29.

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 30.

In General

(1951) Provisions of 1875 constitution requiring unanimous consent of stockholders for issuance of preferred stock did not create vested right in stockholder so that action of corporation created before adoption of corporation code in 1943 and before adoption of 1945 constitution, which accepted corporation code under § 351.025, in issuing preferred stock on vote of three-fourths of stockholders, was not violative of due process provisions of constitution. Midland Truck Lines v. Atwood, 362 Mo. 397, 241 S.W.2d 903.

(1952) Consent of the state to be sued cannot be implied from this section. Kleban v. Morris, 363 Mo. 7, 247 S.W.2d 832.

(1953) Earnings tax imposed by city of St. Louis under statutory authority held not violative of the due process and uniform tax provisions of the constitution. Walters v. City of St. Louis, 364 Mo. 56, 259 S.W.2d 377.

(1953) Since constitutional guarantees of sections 10 and 22, Article I of the Constitution are for protection against governmental action, and not applicable to acts of individuals as between themselves, contention that labor union's action denied such rights to one of its members does not raise a constitutional question so as to give supreme court jurisdiction of cause. Junkins v. Local Union No. 6313, etc. (Mo.), 263 S.W.2d 337.

(1954) Land Clearance for Redevelopment Law (RSMo, § 99.300 et seq.) does not contravene this provision of the Constitution. State on Inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redev. Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44.

(1957) The Uniform Support of Dependents' Law is not violative of the due process or retrospective law provisions of the constitution. Ivey v. Ayers (Mo.), 301 S.W.2d 790.

(1958) Where on review court of appeals set aside suspension of real estate dealer's license for violation of specific statutory provisions but remanded case to commission for the assessment of penalty for violation of another provision, further notice and hearing were unnecessary before penalty was assessed either under due process requirement or under administrative procedure law. Dittmeier v. Missouri Real Estate Comm. (Mo.), 316 S.W.2d 1; Cert. den. 358 U.S. 941, 79 S.Ct. 347.

(1958) Daughter adopted by testator's daughter in 1909 held to be entitled to share in distribution of remainder of trust estate to "lineal descendants" of testator under will executed in 1927 and where remainder vested in 1955 and such ruling did not render acts passed subsequent to testator's death and prior to vesting of remainder which qualified adopted daughter as lineal descendant violative of §§ 10 and 13 of Art. I of the Constitution. Commerce Trust Co. v. Weed (Mo.), 318 S.W.2d 289.

(1959) Juvenile Code 1957 sustained against contention that it is so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to make unascertainable the standards of conduct required and is thereby violative of the due process provision of the constitution. Minor Children of F.B. v. Caruthers (A.), 323 S.W.2d 397.

(1959) Exclusion of work done for levee and drainage districts from operation of Prevailing Wage Act held not unreasonable classification or special law. City of Joplin v. Industrial Comm. (Mo.), 329 S.W.2d 687.

(1960) Where bridge over railroad right-of-way was constructed under agreement between land developer and railroad, then accepted as part of a county road and finally included within a city, the Public Service Commission could order its reconstruction and apportion the costs thereof between the railroad and city without taking property without due process. State ex rel. C.B. & Q. RR Co. v. Public Serv. Comm. (Mo.), 334 S.W.2d 54.

(1960) Since liquor business does not stand on same plane as other commercial activities and is not lawful except as authorized by statute, statute which does not require a hearing before refusal to renew license for liquor business held valid. Pinzino v. Supervisor of Liquor Control (Mo.), 334 S.W.2d 20.

(1961) Provision of use tax law exempting use of merchandise not readily obtainable in Missouri held void for indefiniteness and uncertainty. Missouri Pacific RR Co. v. Morris (Mo.), 345 S.W.2d 52.

(1961) The striking of the defendant's pleadings in a divorce action because of his failure to pay alimony pendente lite and suit money held to be denial of due process of law. Richman v. Richman (Mo.), 350 S.W.2d 733.

(1961) Ordinance adopted by county operating under a constitutional charter which required the fluoridation of the water supply to be used throughout the county held not violative of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution or this due process provision. Readey v. St. Louis County Water Company (Mo.), 352 S.W.2d 622.

(1962) City zoning ordinance adopted under §§ 89.010 to 89.140 held valid as against contention that it constituted an unwarranted delegation of legislative discretion to an administrative board without sufficient standards or guides. Porporis v. City of Warson Woods (Mo.), 352 S.W.2d 605.

(1962) Ordinance of the City of St. Louis which required any real estate agent when placing a "For Sale" sign on any real estate to indicate on the sign the zoning area in which the property was located held valid. City of St. Louis v. Green (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 606.

(1962) Act prohibiting discriminatory practices in the sale of milk and prohibiting its sale at less than cost held not violative of the equal rights and due process provisions of the constitution. Borden Company v. Thomason (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 735.

(1963) Provision excepting "provisions or other articles of immediate necessity" from Sunday sales prohibition held to render the statute so vague and indefinite that it is incapable of rational enforcement and therefore void. Harvey v. Priest (Mo.), 366 S.W.2d 324.

(1963) Proviso of § 155.050 providing for apportionment of assessed valuation of aircraft of airlines to city owning and operating an airport outside its corporate limits in which airlines had arrivals and departures, and city's attempted levy of tangible personal property taxes on such apportioned valuation were invalid and void as violation of due process clauses of state and federal constitutions. American Airlines, Inc. v. City of St.Louis (Mo.), 368 S.W.2d 161.

(1963) Refusal to rezone vacant tract classified as residential to commercial was unreasonable and arbitrary and infringed plaintiff's rights under due process clause where maintenance of residential zoning bore no substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals or general welfare and where property was three times more valuable as commercial property and was not suited to residential development in view of adjacent commercial development and traffic conditions. Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights (Mo.), 372 S.W.2d 833.

(1964) Sunday sales law upheld against charge that it was unconstitutional as being a special law, containing unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory classifications in violation of plantiffs' right to equal rights and opportunities under the law; and depriving plaintiffs of liberty of property without due process of law. GEM Stores, Inc. v. O'Brien (Mo.), 374 S.W.2d 109.

(1964) Where taxable property lying within the boundaries of a county library district was incorporated by annexation into the boundaries of a city which had a tax supported free public library, held that the property was subject to the taxing power of both districts and such interpretation did not violate Article X, § 3, and Article I, §§ 2, 10, 26 and 28 of the Missouri Constitution. St. Louis County Library District v. Hopkins (Mo.), 375 S.W.2d 71.

(1964) Picketing of funeral home which was in part for the purpose of preventing owners from personally doing any embalming in their own business was for an unlawful purpose. Baue v. Embalmers Federal Labor Union No. 21301 (Mo.), 376 S.W.2d 230.

(1964) Constitutionality of Sunday Sales Act upheld against the charge that it is so vague and indefinite that citizens cannot ascertain or be informed of its meaning contrary to the due process provision of Art. I, § 10 of the Constitution, and in violation of the right of a person accused in a criminal proceeding to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him as provided by Art. I, § 18(a) of the constitution. State ex rel. Eagleton v. McQueen (Mo.), 378 S.W.2d 449.

(1964) Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction of appeal from Public Service Commission's order directing railroad to cancel tariff item on theory of issue requiring construction of due process clause of constitution where actual question was whether or not the commission exceeded its statutory authority. State ex rel. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company v. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 378 S.W.2d 459.

(1964) Validity of city ordinance requiring licensing of television and radio servicemen upheld against charges that it violated due process and equal protection clauses of state and federal constitutions and the "special law" prohibition of the state constitution. McClellan v. Kansas City (Mo.), 379 S.W.2d 500.

(1966) Fact that same agency, State Board of Registration for Healing Arts, both prosecuted and decided the case does not by itself deprive appellant of right of due process of law. Rose v. State Board of Registration for Healing Arts (Mo.), 397 S.W.2d 570.

(1966) When the legislative body of a city chooses to delegate to itself the discretionary power to enforce its special permit regulation, it acts administratively in passing on applications for such permits and is thus enforcing the legislation previously enacted; and such discretion must be circumscribed by sufficient standards to require it to be reasonably, not arbitrarily, exercised. State v. City of Winchester (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 47.

(1972) City ordinance which prohibited minors, with certain exceptions, entering premises where liquor was sold by the drink except those premises where sales of prepared meals and food totalled 50% of the gross income during the three calendar months upheld against charge that it was unconstitutional in that it unreasonably classified licensed establishments on a basis that had no relation to any evil sought to be controlled. Waldrop v. Burge (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 537.

(1972) The right of a party-litigant to depose witnesses is an absolute right and act of trial court in divorce action in quashing defendant's deposition subpoenas because he was delinquent in paying pendente lite allowances was error as it deprived him of that right and substantially limited the range of his defense. Norkunas v. Norkunas (A.), 480 S.W.2d 92.

(1973) Ordinance making registered owner liable for improper parking of vehicle does not result in failure of due process. City of Kansas City v. Herty Corp. (Mo.), 499 S.W.2d 449.

(1974) Held that classification of marijuana with more dangerous drugs is not violative of equal protection or due process. State v. Burrow (Mo.), 514 S.W.2d 585.

(1976) Delay between commission of the offense of carrying a concealed weapon and defendant's arrest thereon or filing of information did not abridge defendant's right to speedy trial, nor did it violate his right of due process since no prejudice was demonstrated by the delay. State v. Odzark (A.), 532 S.W.2d 45.

(1976) Issuance of a repossessed title by director of revenue pursuant to § 301.215, to secured creditor who had repossessed automobile by self help under power granted in security agreement did not constitute significant participation by state such as to come within legal definition of "state action", thus due process was not involved and statute was not unconstitutional. Smith v. Spradling (Mo.), 532 S.W.2d 202.

(1976) Denial to members of a religious society of whom only one was a priest and the others were laymen who did not have the religious ministry as a primary and regular vocation, of an occupancy permit to occupy an existing residence as their home in an area zoned single family residential was not a denial of their constitutional rights under the freedom-of-worship and due process clauses of the Missouri Constitution. Association for Educational Development v. Hayward (Mo.), 533 S.W.2d 579.

(2001) Statute of limitations in real property inverse condemnation cases cannot be shorter than that required for entity with power of eminent domain to obtain a prescriptive easement on the property, which is ten years. Shade v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, 69 S.W.3d 503 (Mo.App. W.D.).

Police Power

(1952) Zoning ordinance prohibiting construction of residences on tracts of not less than three acres and forbidding institutional use except by special permit, where same is necessary to conform to general zoning plan, is not invalid. Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771.

(1952) Procedure under § 375.560 taking over insurance company by superintendent because of cessation of business held not violative of due process provision of constitution. Leggett v. Gen. Indem. Exch., 363 Mo. 273, 250 S.W.2d 710.

(1954) Order of state Public Service Commission that railroad company contribute to installation of and maintain flashing light signal at grade crossing found hazardous by such commission does not deprive company of property without due process. State ex rel. Wabash Railroad Co. v. Public Service Comm. (Mo.), 273 S.W.2d 334.

(1957) City ordinance prohibiting sale of intoxicating liquors by wholesaler when retailer was delinquent in his accounts to any wholesaler held not violative of due process. Passler v. Johnson (Mo.), 304 S.W.2d 903.

(1958) Contention that statute providing for apportionment of costs of construction, maintenance and operation of crossing was violative of the due process clauses of the state and federal constitution held without merit. State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. Conrad (Mo.), 310 S.W.2d 871.

(1958) Zoning of area as local business district and restricting use of owner's property as supper club was not violation of this section as classification was reasonable when considered as part of comprehensive zoning plan of the city and when, in the district itself, there were thirty-five residences and only three or four nonconforming uses. Downing v. City of Joplin (Mo.), 312 S.W.2d 81.

(1959) City ordinance regulating the installation and repair of warm air furnaces held not to leave board with uncontrolled discretion as to licensing or to deny due process. Ross v. City of Kansas City (Mo.), 328 S.W.2d 610.

Notice

(1954) Act authorizing hospitalization of mentally ill person (Laws 1953, p. 647) on application of third person and certification of two physicians and also authorizing officer to take such person into custody and to deliver him to hospital without notice and opportunity to be heard denies due process. State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72.

(1954) Insofar as paragraph 3 of § 537.020 provides for proceedings against personal representative of deceased nonresident without adequate notice to him it denies due process. Harris v. Bates (Mo.), 270 S.W.2d 763.

(1957) Service of process by publication in class proceedings to escheat unclaimed excess insurance premiums in registry of court met statutory requirements and did not violate due process by not specifically advising defendants to file answer. State v. Goodbar (Mo.), 297 S.W.2d 525.

(1957) Where after a number of continuance cases was peremptorily set for trial on specified date, and plaintiff's attorney withdrew before that date, due process required that other attorneys could appear for plaintiff on the date peremptorily set without agreeing to immediate trial. Dismissal for failure to prosecute in such circumstances held improper. Magerstadt v. LaForge (Mo.), 303 S.W.2d 130.

(1958) The provision of § 506.210 authorizing service upon the executor or administrator of a deceased nonresident does not violate the due process provisions of the state or federal constitutions. Brooks v. National Bank of Topeka, 251 F.2d 37.

(1958) Section 506.210, amended in 1955, held not violative of due process provisions in conferring jurisdiction on Missouri courts over administrators and executors of estates of nonresidents. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Cross (Mo.), 314 S.W.2d 889.

(1979) Notice of foreclosure authorized by municipal land reutilization law through publication, and a letter to last known property owner of record is not violative of due process. Collector of Revenue of the City of St. Louis v. Parcels of Land Encumbered with Delinquent Tax Liens (Mo.), 585 S.W.2d 486.

Judicial Proceedings

(1956) Prohibition in the Supreme Court is governed by the general law on the subject rather than by the civil code. Where writ was directed to judge of multiple judge circuit who made order which would result in excess of jurisdiction it bound all judges of such circuit and afforded due process. State ex rel. Siegel v. Strother, 365 Mo. 861, 289 S.W.2d 73.

(1959) Where attorney who was retained by defendant in criminal case subsequently became prosecuting attorney, and as such opposed continuance of case sought by defendant and prepared instructions in case tried by assistant, the conviction of defendant would be set aside as prejudicial. State v. Burns (Mo.), 322 S.W.2d 736.

Criminal Prosecutions

(1952) Due process does not require change of venue or right to disqualify judge in a criminal contempt case. Osborne v. Purdome (Mo.), 250 S.W.2d 159.

(1953) Where defendant of low-level intelligence confessed guilt under circumstances indicating that confession was coerced by inspired fear, a promise of protection and daily interrogation over long period of detention, use of confession in his trial was violative of due process clause of constitution. State v. Bradford (Mo.), 262 S.W.2d 584.

(1955) Section 556.285, which makes person convicted more than three times of larceny guilty of grand larceny on conviction of a subsequent larceny held valid against challenger based on the due process, equal protection and ex post facto provisions of the constitution. State v. King (Mo.), 275 S.W.2d 310.

(1955) Supreme Court Rule No. 27.26 is similar to § 2255, 28 U.S.C.A., and, in accordance with judicial construction of that section, a motion alleging that individual was convicted by perjured testimony knowingly procured by the prosecution, stated facts showing denial of due process and, therefore, sufficient to require hearing. State v. Eaton (Mo.), 280 S.W.2d 63.

(1960) In prosecution for rape where defendant entered into an agreement approved by the court by which he was to be relieved of being tried on two other rape charges by accepting the decision of his counsel not to appeal from his conviction on the charge tried, he had no valid claim of lack of due process or equal protection of the laws. State v. Johnson (Mo.), 336 S.W.2d 668.

(1961) Where search warrants for obscene matter were in the language of the statute, specified no publications and left to the individual judgment of the police officer the selection of what he regarded as obscene publications, they failed to provide due process and were invalid. Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, etc., 367 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1708.

(1964) Failure to furnish defendant in prosecution for first degree robbery with free depositions was not a violation of his constitutional rights. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.

(1964) Refusal by court to require production of police report and statement made to warrant officer by police officer was not abuse of discretion and violation of defendant's constitutional rights where there was no showing that report or statement was of such nature that without it defendant's trial would be fundamentally unfair. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.

(1964) Failure to appoint counsel to represent defendant at preliminary examination where he pleaded not guilty held not to deprive him of due process of law nor equal protection of the law. State v. Phelps (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 616.

(1966) As there is no constitutional requirement that there be a transcript of the testimony in a preliminary hearing, nor even a constitutional requirement that a preliminary hearing be held, defendant had no constitutional right to have a transcript of preliminary hearing. State v. Maxwell (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 156.

(1966) Defendant in criminal case has no constitutional right to examine the police record, if any, of complaining witness. State v. Maxwell (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 156.

(1967) Court's compelling defendant of limited education to go on trial for felony without counsel immediately upon the withdrawal without notice of his employed counsel resulted in a denial of due process of law. State v. Martin (Mo.), 411 S.W.2d 215.

(1967) If one confession statement or admission is simply part of one continuous process in which several confessions are obtained, all are invalid. State v. Linder (Mo.), 412 S.W.2d 412.

(1971) Where police station identification, following warning, occurred within 45 minutes after purse snatching and on-scene identification, following warning, and nothing took place at police station that had not already occurred at on-scene identification, the in-court identification could not be found to have been tainted by illegal extrajudicial identification at police station. State v. Grayson (Mo.), 467 S.W.2d 891.

(1972) There was no denial of due process based on alleged unfairness of one-to-one confrontation between accused and identifying witness shortly after commission of crime where identification was not used at trial; nor was there denial of due process based on police station lineups without the suspect being informed that their purpose was possible identification or that he was entitled to have counsel present or without obtaining a waiver of his right to counsel when lineups occurred shortly after crime and long before information was filed. Robinson v. State (Mo.), 482 S.W.2d 492.

(1973) Defendant denied due process when sole prosecution witness had answered in effect that he had received no inducement to testify when in fact murder charge against him had been dismissed immediately prior to trial. State v. McClain (Mo.), 498 S.W.2d 798.

Regulation

(1967) The Public Service Commission is without power to order a telephone company to provide services in an area in which it has not offered, proffered or undertaken to provide service because such compulsion would be tantamount to an appropriation of the telephone company's property to a public service to which it has not dedicated such property, a taking of private property for public use without just compensation. State v. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 416 S.W.2d 109.

(1967) Attempt by public service commission to order a telephone company to provide services in an area which it has not offered, proffered or undertaken to serve is tantamount to an appropriation of private property for public use without just compensation. State v. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 416 S.W.2d 109.

Personal Rights

(1968) Held that use of jury forms with variance in type, size, and style for guilty form and not guilty form did not constitute a comment on the evidence or a denial of due process or equal protection. State v. Dennison (Mo.), 428 S.W.2d 573.

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 16.

(1951) Section 462.430, authorizing attachment for contempt for failure to surrender assets to estate, held not unconstitutional as against contention it authorizes imprisonment for debt. Zeitinger v. Mitchell (Mo.), 244 S.W.2d 91.

(1976) Held that imprisonment for contempt is proper remedy for failure to comply with court order for maintenance and child support when person disobeying order has intentionally placed himself in a position which made compliance impossible. State ex rel. Stanhope v. Pratt overruling Coughlin v. Ehlert, 39 Mo. 285 (1866). State ex rel. Stanhope v. Pratt (Mo.), 533 S.W.2d 567.

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 26.

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art II, § 15.

(1953) Relation between Public School Retirement System of St. Louis and its members is contractual and § 169.515 of 1953 Act (H.B. 164) which required transfer of certain funds thereof to special fund to be used in making contributions to Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance System for certain members thereof, held invalid as impairing the obligations of contract. Dictum: Section 169.510 of 1953 Act also void for same reason. State ex rel. Phillip v. Public School Retirement System, 364 Mo. 395, 262 S.W.2d 569.

(1955) Section 556.285 which makes person convicted more than three times of larceny guilty of grand larceny on conviction of a subsequent larceny held valid against challenge based on the due process, equal protection and ex post facto provisions of the constitution. State v. King (Mo.), 275 S.W.2d 310.

(1956) Where attorney's contract with insurance superintendent contemplated his payment out of funds recovered by litigation contrary to statute for payment of such compensation, a statute authorizing escheat of such recovered funds was, therefore, not violative of obligation of contract. Jacobs v. Leggett (Mo.), 295 S.W.2d 825.

(1956) Provision authorizing pledge of on-street parking meter receipts for payment of revenue bonds issued to enable city to acquire off-street parking facilities held constitutional. Petition of City of Liberty (Mo.), 296 S.W.2d 117.

(1958) Where definition of "habitual violator of traffic laws" authorizing suspension of driver's license was changed so as to include one convicted four times in two years rather than those convicted five times in one year, it applied to one convicted three times before the change was made and one time thereafter, and was not retrospective in violation of the constitution. Barbieri v. Morris (Mo.), 315 S.W.2d 711.

(1958) Daughter adopted by testator's daughter in 1909 held to be entitled to share in distribution of remainder of trust estate to "lineal descendants" of testator under will executed in 1927 and where remainder which qualified adopted daughter as lineal descendant violative of § 10 and 13 of Art. I of the Constitution. Commerce Trust Co. v. Weed (Mo.), 318 S.W.2d 289.

(1960) Provision of 1959 act authorizing the judge of the court to fix the punishment rather than a jury, upon establishment of prior offenses, held not to violate provision of Constitution prohibiting ex post facto laws. State v. Morton (Mo.), 338 S.W.2d 858.

(1961) The rule of immunity of charities from suits for torts held not to be an irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities for the reason that the grant of privileges prohibited are those granted to individuals and not to charities as a class. Schulte v. Missionaries of LaSalette Corp. of Mo. (Mo.), 352 S.W.2d 636.

(1961) Fact that habitual criminal act was amended in 1959 would not make it inapplicable to an act committed prior to the effective date of that act or make it an ex post facto law within the meaning of the constitution. State v. Donnell (Mo.), 351 S.W.2d 775.

(1962) Increase of benefits to previously retired members of State Employees Retirement System held void as an impairment of contract as to members not yet retired and as being retrospective as it affects retired members. State v. Missouri State Employees Retirement System (Mo.), 362 S.W.2d 571.

(1971) Mandamus lay, under subsection 3 of § 206.120, to compel county court judges to dissolve a hospital district established in 1963 where no successful election on proposition to borrow money for any purpose had been conducted in the district within five years from its establishment although action was begun less than five years after the effective date of subsection 3 of § 206.120. State ex rel. Meyer v. Cobb (Mo.), 467 S.W.2d 854.

(1986) Application of §§ 610.100 to 610.120, RSMo, to records kept before September 28, 1973, does not violate ban on ex post facto or retroactive law. Martin v. Schmalz, 713 S.W.2d 22 (Mo.App. 1986).

(1993) Expiration of statutes of limitation for tort actions created vested right in favor of defendants to be free from suit; therefore, to extent that § 537.046, RSMo, authorizes causes of action that would have been barred under statutes of limitation in effect prior to effective date of § 537.600, RSMo, statute contravenes constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws. Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 862 S.W.2d 338 (Mo. en banc).

(2013) Constitutional prohibition against enacting a law retrospective in its operation applies only to laws affecting civil rights and remedies and does not apply to criminal statutes. State v. Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d 410 (Mo.banc).

(2023) City's passage of ordinance which had effect of immediately extinguishing taxpayer's preexisting right to seek an earnings tax refund, in the absence of a reasonable opportunity to file refund request after effective date of new ordinance, violated bar against retroactive legislation.  Huebert v. City of Kansas City, 666 S.W.3d 289 (Mo.App.W.D).

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II § 10.

(1954) This section is not applicable to authorize action against charitable institution for tort of its servant even though liability insurance is carried by the institution. Kreuger v. Schmiechen, 364 Mo. 568, 264 S.W.2d 311.

(1956) Where service of summons was had in the state on president of defendant, a foreign corporation which was not doing business in this state, the court had no right to assume jurisdiction over the defendant, and the constitutional provision had no application. Collar v. Peninsular Gas Co. (Mo.), 295 S.W.2d 88.

(1958) Validity of doctrine of forum non conveniens discussed and held not to apply to tort action brought by resident of Wyandotte County, Kansas, against resident of Johnson County, Kansas, in Kansas City, Missouri, since there was no clear showing of inconvenience of forum nor that the ends of justice required it. Loftus v. Lee (Mo.), 308 S.W.2d 654.

(1964) Failure to furnish defendant in prosecution for first degree robbery with free depositions was not a violation of his constitutional rights. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.

(1964) Failure to appoint counsel to represent defendant at preliminary examination where he pleaded not guilty held not to deprive him of due process of law nor equal protection of the law. State v. Phelps (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 616.

(1979) Held, chapter 538 violates Art. I, § 14 of the constitution of Missouri and must be held invalid for that reason. State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital for Children v. Gaertner (Mo.), 583 S.W.2d 107.

(1993) Criminal prosecution for statements made in civil pleading does not violate constitution. Right of access to courts does not include right to make death threats in pleadings. Alexander v. State, 864 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. App. W.D.).

(2000) Provisions of Missouri's dram shop law (section 537.053, RSMo) that impose liability only upon conviction of sale of liquor to a person under age or to an obviously intoxicated person are an unconstitutional violation of the state's open courts provision, because access to the courts is conditioned upon a prosecutor's decision to bring the case. Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545 (Mo.banc).

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 11 (Amended August 5, 2014).

(1951) Application for and acceptance of license as transporter of intoxicating liquor under § 311.420 constitutes waiver of right to object to inspection of cargo by enforcement officers. State v. Ward, 361 Mo. 1236, 239 S.W.2d 313.

(1952) Where there was no evidence that defendants had committed crime, that officers had any suspicion that they had committed felony nor that officers had warrants for arrest of defendants, their arrest was illegal and subsequent search of defendant's automobile in which two guns were found was an unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by § 15, Art. I of the constitution. State v. Cuezze (Mo.), 249 S.W.2d 373.

(1952) Whether relevant and competent evidence was obtained by unlawful search or seizure will not be determined unless defendant previously moved for suppression of such evidence or possibly where he was surprised by its introduction. State v. O'Brien (Mo.), 252 S.W.2d 357.

(1953) Where incriminating letter which was strongly corroborative of state witness' testimony was found in unlawful search of appellant's house its admission in evidence over objection and after motion to suppress held error and not harmless as merely cumulative. State v. Clark (Mo.), 259 S.W.2d 813.

(1953) If party to action for forfeiture does not establish that he is the owner of or has an interest in seized whiskey he cannot question the legality of the search and seizure. State v. Rodgers, 364 Mo. 247, S.W.2d 736.

(1953) Subpoena issued by court at request of prosecuting attorney, requiring production of records before grand jury and returnable at time grand jury was not in session and at time when matters affected by such records were not under grand jury investigation, was void both under the statutes and constitution of this state. State ex rel. Burke v. Scott, 364 Mo. 420, 263 S.W.2d 614.

(1954) Where police officers heard shots and saw defendant place unidentified object in his pocket and then flee, their search of him after overtaking him and finding loaded revolver from which one shot had been fired in his pocket was not unreasonable. State v. Charles (Mo.), 268 S.W.2d 830.

(1954) Where defendant in prosecution for illegal sale of liquor failed to object to introduction of whiskey in evidence on grounds of unlawful search and seizure, the objection was waived even though motion to suppress the whiskey had been filed and overruled. State v. Egan (A.), 272 S.W.2d 719.

(1954) Where customer placed groceries and illegally purchased whiskey in his car which was parked on driveway of grocery store, a search of his car cannot be objected to by store owner on prosecution for illegal sale of liquor. State v. Egan (A.), 272 S.W.2d 719.

(1955) Where police watched house for half hour, saw persons enter a room therein and through tear in window shade saw defendant and others with policy book and other paraphernalia and when defendant and another were arrested policy result drawings were taken from him, search and seizure not violative of constitutional provisions as to search and seizure or as to self-incrimination. State v. Hardy (Mo.), 276 S.W.2d 90.

(1955) Where defendant voluntarily testifying, admitted possession of stolen property, she could not complain of prior denial of motion to suppress evidence and admission of evidence obtained by allegedly illegal search. State v. Bray (A.), 278 S.W.2d 49.

(1955) Testimony of witnesses who accompanied police officers on unlawful search and testimony of others identifying articles seized in such search held inadmissible in prosecution for receiving stolen property. State v. Hunt (Mo.), 280 S.W.2d 37.

(1955) Where highway patrol officer stopped car because lighted firecrackers were being thrown from windows, and observed suspicious merchandise in the car, there was no search. State v. Harre (Mo.), 280 S.W.2d 41.

(1956) Police officers, dispatched to investigate report that burglar alarm in store building was sounding, arrested individuals in truck which was being operated at high speed at night and which turned on its lights on approaching city limits. Arrest of operator held lawful and search of vehicle held proper. State v. Brown (Mo.), 291 S.W.2d 615.

(1956) Where person in control of automobile consented to its search, a passenger in the automobile who was arrested with such person could not object to a search of the auto or of wardrobe bag found in the auto. State v. Green (Mo.), 292 S.W.2d 283.

(1958) Where officer was authorized to arrest a person on suspicion after seeing loaded rifle in back seat of car, a search of the car was lawful and stolen property therein found held admissible. State v. Cantrell (Mo.), 310 S.W.2d 866.

(1958) In prosecution for narcotic violation, on motion to suppress evidence on ground evidence was obtained by unlawful arrest and search, trial court had discretion to require or not to require arresting officer to disclose name of person who gave him information on which arrest was based. State v. Edwards (Mo.), 317 S.W.2d 441.

(1960) Where policeman had stopped car and arrested driver for running red light and through window saw rifles and guns partially covered with blankets and noticed rear end of automobile sagging and asked driver to unlock trunk disclosing merchandise, there was no unreasonable search and seizure and such items were admissible in evidence in burglary prosecution. State v. Mallory (Mo.), 336 S.W.2d 383; Cert. den. 364 U.S. 852, 81 S.Ct. 99, 5 L.Ed.2d 75.

(1960) Where defendant was issued a certificate of occupancy by the department of public safety of the city for occupancy of property to be used as a rooming house and where the defendant applied for permit to operate a rooming house and was actually operating a rooming house, his refusal to permit the inspection of the premises by city inspector constituted resisting officers. The ordinance authorizing the inspection did not constitute unreasonable search and seizure nor did it require self-incrimination. City of St. Louis v. Evans (Mo.), 337 S.W.2d 948.

(1961) Where police and firemen lawfully entered building after fire, their search of the premises was lawful and not unreasonable. State v. Cohn (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 691.

(1961) Accused could not complain of alleged unlawful search of vehicle which was owned by his codefendant. State v. Martin (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 680.

(1962) Neither the federal nor state constitution nor any of our statutes requires the magistrate to appoint counsel for the accused in a preliminary examination and accordingly the failure of the record to show such appointment is not ground for setting aside a subsequent conviction based upon an information in the circuit court during the trial of which appellant had counsel. State v. Turner (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 602.

(1962) Where officer late at night arrested individual for speeding and driving without lights and upon such arrest discovered a metal cash box containing checks payable to an insurance company in the car it was not unlawful thereafter for the officer to search the trunk of the car where he found certain adding machines and calculating machines stolen from an insurance company. State v. Camper (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 676.

(1962) Where the defendant on trial for the sale of narcotics testified on direct examination that after he was arrested the contents of his stomach were removed and also that the police officers kept the contents and checked it, it was not error for the court to permit the prosecution then to show the results of the check which was to the effect that heroin was found in the defendant's stomach. State v. Odom (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 708.

(1962) Evidence sufficient to establish that officers had, prior to arrest of defendant, reasonable cause to suspect defendant was guilty of first degree robbery by means of dangerous and deadly weapon and search of closet opening off room in residence where defendant was arrested was reasonable. State v. Redding (Mo.), 357 S.W.2d 103.

(1962) Policeman who heard burglar alarm go off in dry goods store about 8:00 p.m. and found front door locked and defendant standing inside framework of open rear door had reasonable ground to believe defendant had committed or attempted to commit a felony. Arrest and search of defendant's person was lawful and apparatus for use of narcotic drugs found on defendant were properly admitted in prosecution for possession of apparatus for unauthorized use of narcotic drugs. State v. Davenport (Mo.), 360 S.W.2d 710.

(1963) Where officers returned the day following defendant's arrest to search the premises a second time, the second search was not an incident of the arrest and was illegal and admission of defendant's shirt, seized during second search, over defendant's objection was reversible error. State v. Sprout (Mo.), 365 S.W.2d 572.

(1964) Defendant's constitutional rights were not violated by seizure by police of articles lying on dresser in plain sight in motel room where officers obtained key from person in charge of motel, defendant was in flight at the time and there was no showing or contention that motel room was defendant's abode. State v. Enberg (Mo.), 377 S.W.2d 282.

(1964) Search of defendant's automobile without warrant after it was taken to the police department garage following defendant's arrest in motel was too remote in time or place to have been made as incidental to arrest and evidence obtained as result of search was inadmissible. State v. Edmondson (Mo.), 379 S.W.2d 486.

(1964) Evidence obtained from search of premises where defendant's mother resided was properly admitted since constitutional guarantee is a personal one and affords no protection from search to a person who is not the owner of or in possession of the premises and where defendant was not present at time search was made. State v. Anderson (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 591.

(1967) Where defendant was arrested at scene of accident for driving while intoxicated and taken to police station, search made an hour and a half later at police headquarters was incident to arrest and was not unreasonable. State v. Darabcsek (Mo.), 412 S.W.2d 97.

(1968) Search warrant describing premises to be searched as 310 North Hocker was defective when premises actually searched were at 314 North Hocker. Front yard of premises was within "curtilage" and even though evidence seized was in plain sight it was still subject to suppression in view of improper search warrant. State v. Buchanan (Mo.), 432 S.W.2d 342.

(1971) Where defendant had entered plea of guilty to charge of operating vehicle without consent of owner, contention of defendant in proceeding under court rule 27.26 that trial court should have set aside conviction because based upon unlawful arrest, illegal search, and a confession obtained without presence of counsel was properly overruled since no contention was made that alleged preliminary defects induced the plea of guilty and voluntary plea of guilty precluded relief on such grounds. Rew v. State (Mo.), 472 S.W.2d 611.

(1971) Search of farmhouse kitchen not unreasonable when upon arrest of appellant and other boys present they were lined up against kitchen wall, personally searched, then a search of the kitchen only was conducted. Items received in evidence were found in the kitchen where they were either in plain view or on appellant's person, and officers had seen one of the boys throw something behind stove so it was reasonable to move stove to discover evidence. State v. Erwin (Mo.), 473 S.W.2d 394.

(1972) Admissions contained in letter written while defendant was in jail awaiting trial were not obtained by unconstitutional search because defendant knew his letters would be read by jailers prior to mailing under jail security regulations. State v. Johnson (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 516.

(1972) Where officer was on his way to burglary and stopped to look in car parked in vicinity and was later informed by radio that items of general description of those he saw in plain sight through car window were taken in the burglary and burglars had not been apprehended, officer had probable cause to search car without search warrant. State v. Brown (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 519.

(1972) State was not obligated to hold a lineup prior to preliminary hearing and fact that eye witnesses to robbery saw defendant when they appeared at preliminary hearing which defendant waived was not so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that his motion to suppress their in-court identification should have been sustained. State v. Hazelhorst (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 543.

(1972) Where officer while shining flashlight on sticker on windshield of car to obtain city license number for citation for illegal parking saw hand-rolled cigarette on front seat of car which he believed to contain marijuana and arrested defendant for possession thereof, search of vehicle and defendant, who was standing outside of car, subsequent to arrest and seizure of marijuana revealed thereby was legal. State v. Hawkins (Mo.), 482 S.W.2d 477.

(1974) Held seizure of marijuana was unreasonable search and seizure. See this case for in depth discussion of "search and seizure". Kansas City v. Butters (A.), 507 S.W.2d 49.

(1974) For discussion of law of search and seizure as related to automobiles, see State v. Achter (A.), 512 S.W.2d 894.

(1975) Where allegedly obscene film is being shown in a commercial theater the risk of loss of evidence is not so great so as to authorize seizure without procuring a warrant based on prior judicial determination of probable cause. State v. McMillan (Mo.), 520 S.W.2d 26.

(1975) Warrantless search upheld on "exigent doctrine". State v. Wiley (Mo.), 522 S.W.2d 281. (1975) Evidence seized at time of warrantless arrest where probable cause for arrest was not shown by state was inadmissible as was gun residue test made later. State v. Howell (Mo.), 524 S.W.2d 11.

(1975) Evidence seized at time of warrantless arrest where probable cause for arrest was not shown by state was inadmissible as was gun residue test made later. State v. Howell (Mo.), 524 S.W.2d 11.

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 28 (Amended November 6, 1900).

(1977) Grand jury cannot report its findings after investigation of a named public official except by indictment. If no indictment is found, an interim "report" should be expunged from the record. Matter of Interim Report of Grand Jury (Mo.), 553 S.W.2d 479.

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 12 (Amended November 6, 1900), and Sch. of 1875 and § 17.

(1961) Provision authorizing prosecution of felony in state courts by information or indictment is not violative of Amendments V and XIV of the Federal Constitution. State v. Cooper (Mo.), 344 S.W.2d 72; Cert. denied 368 U.S. 855, 82 S.Ct. 91.

(1964) Failure to furnish defendant in prosecution for first degree robbery with free depositions was not a violation of his constitutional rights. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.

(1964) Refusal by court to require production of police report and statement made to warrant office by police officer was not abuse of discretion and violation of defendant's constitutional rights where there was no showing that report or statement was of such nature that without it defendant's trial would be fundamentally unfair. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.

(1964) The constitutional limitations upon search and seizure apply only to the owner or one in possession of the premises and defendant could not raise the question of an illegal search of someone else's property. State v. Worley (Mo.), 383 S.W.2d 529.

(1967) Provisions of the fifth amendment to the federal constitution that no person shall be held to answer for a capital crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury does not apply to state procedure, and prosecution may be either by indictment or information. State v. Crump (Mo.), 412 S.W.2d 490.

(2008) Section is violated when signature modus operandi corroboration evidence is offered and admitted; such evidence is an unlawful means to admitting propensity evidence. State v. Vorhees, 248 S.W.3d 585 (Mo.banc).

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 22.

Generally

(1952) Where defendant was released from imprisonment in penitentiary on habeas corpus over nineteen years after original commitment because failure to have been provided counsel, his subsequent trial on same charge did not offend against constitutional guaranty of speedy trial. State v. Hadley (Mo.), 249 S.W.2d 857.

(1952) Where defendant announced that he understood the charge against him and that he would represent himself and when court later requested an attorney to sit in and assist defendant, defendant stated he still did not think he needed a lawyer, a contention that defendant was not accorded counsel and that counsel was not given an opportunity to prepare defense, was overruled. State v. Hurley (Mo.), 251 S.W.2d 617.

(1953) Where accused was arrested at midnight, arraigned at 9:00 a.m. the following morning and pleaded guilty without record showing opportunity to consult with counsel, he should be released from incarceration under sentence but should be rearraigned on charge. Ex parte Stone (A.), 255 S.W.2d 155.

(1954) Where defendant's counsel withdrew after verdict and defendant had no attorney to file a motion for a new trial, it could not be said his constitutional rights were violated in absence of showing of error in trial. State v. Mischanko (Mo.), 272 S.W.2d 210.

(1955) Admission of prosecutor's testimony as to what he did after he questioned alleged coconspirator in robbery prosecution and its emphasis in argument by prosecutor to jury held prejudicially erroneous as involving the denial of accused's right to meet witnesses against him face to face. State v. Chernick (Mo.), 280 S.W.2d 56.

(1956) Defendant is not entitled to more than one court appointed attorney and trial court has discretion as to whether more than one shall be appointed. State v. Lord (Mo.), 286 S.W.2d 737.

(1958) In prosecution for stealing under habitual criminal law, where certified record of the state penitentiary contained notations of defendant's imprisonment in two other states and also that defendant was wanted by police, it was error to admit in evidence the part containing such notations. State v. Dunn (Mo.), 308 S.W.2d 643.

(1958) Indictment charging defendant with "feloniously and fraudulently" buying and receiving certain stolen property was insufficient as quoted words are not of similar import to "intent to defraud" and not sufficiently definite and certain to satisfy constitutional and statutory requirements. State v. Harris (Mo.), 313 S.W.2d 664.

(1958) Defendant of a mental age of twelve years was told at a coroner's inquest to which he had been subpoenaed that under the constitution he was not obligated to testify. He replied that he understood that and wanted to tell all he knew. His statements were held to be admissible. State v. Mayabb (Mo.), 316 S.W.2d 609.

(1958) Defendant held to have waived right to be represented by counsel and to have been capable of doing so. State v. Glenn (Mo.), 317 S.W.2d 403; Cert. den. 358 U.S. 942, 79 S.Ct. 348.

(1959) This section applies to crimes against the state and does not apply to proceedings by municipalities for violation of municipal police regulations. City of Webster Groves v. Quick (Mo.), 319 S.W.2d 543.

(1959) Where defendant had refused service of public defender and dismissed two court-appointed attorneys, one of whom he had requested by name, and insisted up to trial date that he wanted to represent himself, but the court, over defendant's objection, provided him with counsel, defendant was not denied due process of law. State v. Warren (Mo.), 321 S.W.2d 705.

(1961) Where defendant refused the offer of the court to appoint counsel for him, the court's finding that the defendant was mentally able and sufficiently informed to decide his need for counsel was supported by the evidence. State v. Slicker (Mo.), 342 S.W.2d 946.

(1961) Defendant was not deprived of constitutional right to appear and defend in person where he was represented by competent counsel throughout all stages of trial and was personally present at all times except when voluntarily absent for short time during proceedings in chambers when record of prior convictions was presented to judge under second offender law. State v. Colbert (Mo.), 344 S.W.2d 115.

(1961) A proceeding under Rule 27.26 to vacate a judgment and sentence is not a step in the criminal proceedings entitling the defendant to "appear and defend, in person" under the constitution of Missouri. State v. Hurst (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 177.

(1963) Failure of trial court to grant defendant's application for subpoenas for witnesses which was not specifically ruled on and not pursued when adequate opportunity to do so existed, could not, after verdict, form basis of prejudicial error when defendant had announced ready for trial and proceeded with no request for attendance of any witnesses and made no offer of proof as to expected testimony of desired witnesses. State v. Chapman (Mo.), 365 S.W.2d 551.

(1964) Constitutionality of Sunday sales act upheld against the charge that it is so vague and indefinite that citizens cannot ascertain or be informed of its meaning contrary to the due process provision of Art. I, § 10 of the constitution, and in violation of the right of a person accused in a criminal proceeding to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him as provided by Art. I, § 18(a) of the constitution. State ex rel. Eagleton v. McQueen (Mo.), 378 S.W.2d 449.

(1964) Judge's statement to jury in answer to their question about sentence to be imposed, after submission of cause to jury and in absence of defense counsel, that the jury should refer to instructions and the three forms of verdict given them and that the court would have no objection to jury using form of verdict that did not refer to the prior conviction if they felt it appropriate was not such a denial of defendant's rights as to make judgment subject to collateral attack nor would it have afforded defendant any basis for relief had his counsel been aware of the occurrence so that the matter could have been raised on appeal. State v. Baugh (Mo.), 382 S.W.2d 608.

(1964) Failure to appoint counsel to represent defendant at preliminary examination where he pleaded not guilty held not to deprive him due process of law nor equal protection of the law. State v. Phelps (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 616.

(1966) As there is no constitutional requirement that there be a transcript of the testimony in a preliminary hearing, nor even a constitutional requirement that a preliminary hearing be held, defendant had no constitutional right to have a transcript of preliminary hearing. State v. Maxwell (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 156.

(1966) Defendant in criminal case has no constitutional right to examine the police record, if any, of complaining witness. State v. Maxwell (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 156.

(1966) Allegations framed in the language of the statute held sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements. State v. Tandy (Mo.), 401 S.W.2d 409.

(1966) Defendant who sought or by his own conduct caused continuance cannot complain that right to speedy trial was violated. State v. Barrett (Mo.), 406 S.W.2d 602.

(1967) Court's compelling defendant of limited education to go on trial for felony without counsel immediately upon the withdrawal without notice of his employed counsel resulted in a denial of due process of law. State v. Martin (Mo.), 411 S.W.2d 215.

(1967) The appointment of counsel for an accused at a preliminary examination is not required by either the federal or state constitution or by statutes of this state. State v. Benison (Mo.), 415 S.W.2d 773.

(1967) The decision of United States Supreme Court in Douglas v. California that an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel on state appeal applied retrospectively to the case of an indigent prisoner whose conviction was affirmed when he was not represented by counsel. Swenson v. Donnell (C.A. Mo.), 382 F.2d 248.

(1968) Denial of counsel in preliminary hearing is not a constitutional infirmity where defendant pleaded not guilty and was otherwise not shown to have been prejudiced. Pope v. Swenson (A.), 395 F.2d 321.

(1968) Failure to furnish counsel to accused during interrogation before confession at a time before decision in Escobedo case was not so prejudicial as to infect the subsequent trial with an absence of fundamental fairness. Howard v. Swenson (A.), 404 F.2d 469.

(1974) Held that failure of counsel to interview state's witnesses amounted to ineffective counsel. McQueen v. Swenson (C.A. Mo.), 498 F.2d 207.

(1975) Held that admission of evidence through closed circuit television was proper in a prosecution for violation of a city ordinance. The question was raised under the provision of the United States Const. and was not questioned under Art. I, § 18(a), const. of Mo. A four to three decision. Kansas City v. McCoy (Mo.), 525 S.W.2d 336.

Right to be Present to Defend

(1967) Accused's presence is not necessary during proceedings which are not part of the trial, such as preliminary or formal proceedings or motions which do not affect his guilt or innocence. State v. Durham (Mo.), 416 S.W.2d 79. (1973) Right to be present to defend request for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum made one day before motion for new trial was to be heard when counsel had known of date of hearing for some time was not timely made and constitutional right to appear and defend in person was not denied. State v. Bizzle (A.), 500 S.W.2d 259.

(1973) Right to be present to defend request for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum made one day before motion for new trial was to be heard when counsel had known of date of hearing for some time was not timely made and constitutional right to appear and defend in person was not denied. State v. Bizzle (A.), 500 S.W.2d 259.

Speedy Trial by Impartial Jury of County

(1968) Held that in the absence of apparent abuse continuances granted at request of defendant's counsel, even though made without knowledge and consent of defendant, would not constitute a denial of right to speedy trial. State v. Holmes (Mo.), 428 S.W.2d 571.

(1972) Although information was filed during September 1968 term and trial began during September 1969 term after elapse of four terms of court, since defendant took no action at any time to secure a trial until he filed motion for discharge at May 1969 term defendant was not entitled to discharge. Failure to take affirmative action seeking a speedy trial constitutes waiver of that right. State v. Wright (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 581.

(1972) Where appellant had escaped from custody before arraignment set for March 31, 1966, and was convicted of crime in California and on June 10, 1970, was paroled from California sentence and returned for trial in Missouri, there was no denial of constitutional right to speedy trial since defendant showed no prejudice except his assertions that each year made it more difficult to find witnesses and that the Missouri detainer precluded him from California rehabilitation programs. State v. Endres (Mo.), 482 S.W.2d 480.

(1974) Right to a speedy trial arises only after the information was filed. A complaint represents only a possiblity that a criminal indictment or information will be filed. Trial within eight days after filing of information held not failure to have speedy trial. State v. York (Mo.), 511 S.W.2d 758.

(1976) Delay between commission of the offense of carrying a concealed weapon and defendant's arrest thereon or filing of information did not abridge defendant's right to speedy trial, nor did it violate his right of due process since no prejudice was demonstrated by the delay. State v. Odzark (A.), 532 S.W.2d 45.

(1986) Whether a person's right to a speedy trial has been violated depends upon four factors: (1) The length of the delay, (2) The reason for the delay, (3) The defendant's assertion to his right to a speedy trial, and (4) The prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. State v. Kirksey, 713 S.W.2d 841 (Mo.App. 1986).

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Source: Const. of 1945.

(1973) Where state used deposition of witness taken by defendant's counsel alone, held that adequate satisfaction of both the right of confrontation and of cross examination cannot be accomplished by either the defendant or his counsel alone, and it was error to permit the use of this constitutionally and basically unacceptable deposition by the sate. State v. Jackson (A.) 495 S.W.2d 80.

­­--------

(Adopted November 4, 2014).

(2017) New rule of evidence adopted in section applies to all trials occurring on or after December 4, 2014, the effective date of the amendment, regardless of when the crimes were alleged to have occurred.  State ex rel. Tipler v. Gardner, 506 S.W.3d 922 (Mo.).

(2018) Provision authorizing admission of prior criminal acts to prove propensity in prosecutions for crimes of a sexual nature involving minor victims does not, on its face, violate due process.  State v. Williams, 548 S.W.3d 275 (Mo. banc).

­­--------

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 23.

(1952) Habitual criminal statute goes only to the punishment, not the guilt or innocence of the accused on trial, and under it no punishment is imposed for the prior offense. Proceedings under it, therefore, do not violate double jeopardy or other provisions of constitution. State v. O'Brien (Mo.), 252 S.W.2d 357.

(1952) Where defendant is convicted of common assault in prosecution for felonious assault with intent to ravish and thereafter new trial is granted, cause stands as though there had been no trial at all and defendant may be tried for the felony charged in the indictment. State v. Higgins (A.), 252 S.W.2d 641.

(1953) Where defendant of low-level intelligence confessed guilt under circumstances indicating that confession was coerced by inspired fear, a promise of protection and daily interrogation over long period of detention, use of confession in his trial was violative of due process clause of constitution. State v. Bradford (Mo.), 262 S.W.2d 584.

(1954) Plea in abatement in criminal prosecution based on stated conclusions that defendant had been compelled to testify before the grand jury which was investigating offense with which defendant was later charged held properly overruled where testimony required was not shown either in verified plea or by evidence. State v. Bright, 269 S.W.2d 615.

(1955) Where police watched house for half hour, saw persons enter a room therein and through tear in window shade saw defendant and others with policy book and other paraphernalia and when defendant and another were arrested policy result drawings were taken from him, search and seizure not violative of constitutional provisions as to search and seizure or as to self-incrimination. State v. Hardy (Mo.), 276 S.W.2d 90.

(1955) Conviction of defendant of robbery does not bar his prosecution for assault with intent to kill where such assault was committed in progress of robbery or as part of the same transaction. State v. Chernick (Mo.), 278 S.W.2d 741.

(1956) Where defendant charged with first degree murder was at liberty on bond and jury was discharged on its failure to reach a verdict during his voluntary, although inadvertent, absence from courtroom, his retrial did not constitute double jeopardy. State v. McCrary, 365 Mo. 799, 287 S.W.2d 785.

(1957) Where trial on murder charge resulted in "hung jury", and case was continued for some time and nolle prosequi was entered after jury had been called and qualified but not sworn, defendant was not placed in jeopardy and could be again charged with the offense even though nolle prosequi judgment recited that defendant was "acquitted". State v. Berry (Mo.), 298 S.W.2d 429.

(1957) Common assault charge did not merge in peace disturbance charge upon the street even though the disturbance was "by fighting" and so acquittal of peace disturbance charge did not bar prosecution for common assault. State v. Brooks (A.), 298 S.W.2d 511.

1958) Where motion for new trial of accused is sustained on ground evidence was insufficient and the conviction is set aside, accused is estopped to plead the former conviction as a bar to another trial on the same or a new indictment. State v. Patton (Mo.), 308 S.W.2d 641.

(1959) Where defendant was discharged from conviction by circuit court on ground information on which he was convicted was defective, his subsequent trial for same offense on valid information did not constitute double jeopardy. U.S. ex rel. Jones v. Nash, 264 F.2d 610.

(1959) Where confession appears to be entirely voluntary, the failure of the officers taking it to warn accused of constitutional right to remain silent or to have counsel present, would not make it admissible. State v. Laspy (Mo.), 323 S.W.2d 713.

(1959) When a defendant (in a criminal case) put his sanity in issue, he waives all privilege either under the physician privilege statute or under the self-incrimination section, to exclude testimony of any doctors who have examined him for this purpose. State v. Swinburne (Mo.), 324 S.W.2d 746.

(1959) Section 491.080 is not as broad as the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination and so does not authorize compulsory testimony in examination of judgment debtor when constitutional privilege is claimed. State ex rel. North v. Kirtley (Mo.), 327 S.W.2d 166.

(1960) Where defendant was issued a certificate of occupancy by the department of public safety of the city for occupancy of property to be used as a rooming house and where the defendant applied for permit to operate a rooming house and was actually operating a rooming house, his refusal to permit the inspection of the premises by city inspectors constituted resisting officers. The ordinance authorizing the inspection did not constitute unreasonable search and seizure nor did it require self-incrimination. City of St. Louis v. Evans (Mo.), 337 S.W.2d 948.

(1961) Refusal of grand jury witness to answer questions as to when he sold business, whether he had interest in certain real estate and as to whether he knew certain individuals, on ground of self- incrimination, held not basis for commitment for contempt. In re Presta v. Owsley (A.), 345 S.W.2d 649.

(1961) Where accused was charged with robbing several persons at the same place, the acquittal of robbing one of such persons would not bar a prosecution for the robbery of another of such persons. State v. Ashe (Mo.), 350 S.W.2d 768.

(1964) Held prejudicial error to admit testimony of police officer that defendant remained silent and refused to answer questions while under arrest and in custody especially since in view of defendant's condition there was some question as to whether defendant heard or understood what was being asked of him. State v. Phelps (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 616.

(1967) Breath test authorized under this section does not violate due process of law. Blydenburg v. David (Mo.), 413 S.W.2d 284.

(1967) It was not error to introduce police officer's testimony that defendant refused to make a statement while under arrest where defendant brought this testimony out first during cross-examination and subsequently called jury's attention to the refusal to make a statement during argument. State v. Yager (Mo.), 416 S.W.2d 170.

(1967) The privilege against self-incrimination extends not only to refusing to answer the question asked, but also to refusing to to explain how the answer might incriminate the witness. State v. Cavanaugh (A.), 419 S.W.2d 929.

(1967) Defendant who was charged with first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder in first trial and subsequently granted a new trial for error in instructions was not placed in double jeopardy by subsequent first degree murder charge. State v. Crane (Mo.), 420 S.W.2d 309.

(1968) Punishment imposed by prison official for violation of prison rule against escape involves the exercise of an administrative function, not a judicial function, and does not place the defendant in jeopardy within the constitutional sense. It constitutes no defense in a prosecution on a charge of escape. State v. Croney (Mo.), 425 S.W.2d 65.

(1968) Refusal of judgment debtor to answer questions in hearing in circuit court regarding ownership or interest in certain property came under the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. State ex rel. Howard v. Allison (A.), 431 S.W.2d 233.

(1969) Statement by prosecutor that the state's evidence was uncontradicted did not constitute a comment on the failure of defendant to take the witness stand. State v. Robb (Mo.), 439 S.W.2d 510.

(1972) Double jeopardy provision applies only where there has been an acquittal of defendant by a jury. Murray v. State (Mo.), 475 S.W.2d 67.

(1972) Admission in evidence of letter, written by defendant while in jail awaiting trial and read by jailers in the course of jail security, containing incriminating admissions did not violate privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Johnson (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 516.

(1972) Held that separate trials for successive robberies of two filling station attendants did not constitute double jeopardy. State v. Moton (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 785.

(1972) Accused was not subjected to double jeopardy on the ground he was charged with attempted robbery with dangerous and deadly weapon and carrying a concealed weapon since although occurring on same day, the crimes were separate and distinct, taking place at different places and times and defendant did not show that the concealed weapon taken from him at time of arrest was the same weapon used in earlier attempted robbery. Warren v. State (Mo.), 482 S.W.2d 497.

(1973) Held that separate trials and convictions for successive robberies of two filling station attendants not double jeopardy. Moton v. Swenson (C.A. Mo.), 488 F.2d 1060.

(1973) Punishment administered for violation of institutional rules is administrative function and does not constitute double jeopardy for crime committed by inmate of prison. State v. Boyd (Mo.), 498 S.W.2d 532.

(1974) Held that comment on defendant's failure to disclose theory of self-defense before trial violated right against self-incrimination. State v. Butler (A.), 512 S.W.2d 466.

(1974) Privilege against self-incrimination is available in any tribunal and any proceeding including civil cases. When person asserting privilege was seeking no affirmative action, court erred in striking his answer because of his claiming privilege during taking of deposition. State ex rel. Pulliam v. Swink (Mo.), 514 S.W.2d 559.

(1975) Held that conviction of violation of a city ordinance prohibiting drunken driving acts as a bar to subsequent prosecution by the state arising out of the same incident. Prohibition held to be a proper remedy. Weaver v. Schaaf (Mo.), 520 S.W.2d 58.

(1975) Where victim was pistol-whipped and robbed and later shot while unconscious on floor, a charge of assault with intent to kill and armed robbery did not constitute double jeopardy. State v. Ross (A.), 523 S.W.2d 841.

(1975) Even though prosecution for offense which is subject of litigation may be barred by statute of limitation copies of income tax returns cannot be made the subject of discovery procedures since evidence of some other incriminatory nature might be disclosed. State ex rel. Caloia v. Weinstein (A), 525 S.W.2d 779.

(1976) Held, prosecution of defendant for driving while intoxicated after conviction of improper backing of motor vehicle arising out of the same occurrence is not double jeopardy. The two charges involve proof of different facts and are not identical offenses. State v. Johnson (A.), 532 S.W.2d 883.

(1976) Requiring defendant to testify, over objection, in chambers that he had been convicted twice before of driving while intoxicated was reversible error. State v. Kaiser (Mo. banc), 534 S.W.2d 19.

(1979) Provision that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself prohibits not only comments on the failure of a defendant to testify, but also comments which have the effect of compelling a defendant to testify. State v. Lindsey (Mo.), 578 S.W.2d 903.

­­--------

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 24.

CROSS REFERENCE:

Denial or conditions of bail may be set by court, Const. Art. I, § 32

(1954) Mere charge of capital offense does not justify refusal of bail. Evidence must be adduced to establish that the proof is evident or the presumption great. Hickman v. O'Connell (A.), 266 S.W.2d 9.

­­--------

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 25.

(1956) Fixing punishment for second degree murder within statutory limits by jury held not to violate inhibition against cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Nord (Mo.), 286 S.W.2d 775.

(1957) $15,000 bail set for person charged with rape held excessive and reduced to $10,000 in habeas corpus proceeding. Ex parte Marvin Chandler (A.), 297 S.W.2d 616.

(1958) The fact that the defendant in robbery prosecution was given life sentence under habitual criminal statute and fact that his accomplice received only a five-year sentence did not establish that punishment was cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Eckenfels (Mo.), 316 S.W.2d 532.

­­--------

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 28 (Amended November 6, 1900).

(1953) On appeal, in misdemeanor trial, where jury was waived, the finding of the court on the merits must be allowed to stand if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Sargent, 241 A. 1085, 256 S.W.2d 265.

(1953) Since constitutional guarantees of sections 10 and 22, Article I of the Constitution, are for protection against governmental action, and not applicable to acts of individuals as between themselves, contention that labor union's action denied such rights to one of its members does not raise a constitutional question so as to give supreme court jurisdiction of cause. Junkins v. Local Union No. 6313, etc. (Mo.), 263 S.W.2d 337.

(1963) Fact that no women were on the jury panel, without a claim or showing of purposeful and systematic exclusion of women, did not establish that jury was improperly selected to the prejudice of defendant. State v. Andrews (Mo.), 371 S.W.2d 324.

(1964) Where defendant, on appeal from magistrate court to circuit court, filed untimely request under rules of the circuit court for jury trial and did not attack constitutionality of the court rule until trial day, constitutional question was not in issue since not raised at first opportunity and supreme court did not have jurisdiction of appeal. Meadowbrook Country Club v. Davis (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 611.

(1965) An accused has no absolute right to elect that he shall be tried by court without a jury; his waiver of jury must be agreed to by court to be effective. State v. Taylor (Mo.), 391 S.W.2d 835.

(1965) Landowner who failed to file written demand for a jury trial before the assignment of commissions, along with a description of the property to be taken, as required by St. Louis charter waived right to jury trial. City of St. Louis v. Union Quarry and Construction Co. (Mo.), 394 S.W.2d 300.

(1968) There are no educational requirements, other than the ability to read, write, speak, and understand the English language, for jury service, and it is no ground for disqualification of veniremen that at the outset they are unfamiliar with or do not know the meaning of technical legal terms. Parker v. Wallace (Mo.), 431 S.W.2d 136.

(1968) Use of a six member jury in trial for violation of city ordinance does not violate the constitutional guarantee of a right to trial by jury. State ex rel. Cox v. Wilson (Mo.), 435 S.W.2d 333.

(1969) In every criminal case any defendant may, with the assent of the court, waive a jury trial and submit the trial of the case to the court, or may, with the assent of the court, waive a jury of twelve citizens and submit the trial of the case to a jury consisting of less than twelve citizens. State v. McGee (Mo. en banc), 447 S.W.2d 270.

(1971) There is no constitutional right to a trial by jury in municipal ordinance prosecution where the maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed six months. State ex rel. Cole v. Nigro (Mo.), 471 S.W.2d 933.

(1971) Assuming that record made of defense counsel's waiver of jury trial in prosecution for possession of narcotic drugs was inadequate, the additional record made in the Rule 27.26 evidentiary hearing established that defendant was fully aware at time of trial of his right to be tried by a jury and nothing in the records would justify a conclusion that finding of trial judge in the Rule 27.26 proceeding, that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived jury trial, was erroneous. Young v. State (Mo.), 473 S.W.2d 390.

(1972) Evidence supported action of trial court in action for damages for injuries to plaintiff's back in granting defendant new trial where jurors' failure to truthfully answer questions asked on voir dire in regard to prior back injuries and claims amounted to deception and deprived defendant of fair trial by jury. Rodenhauser v. Lashly (Mo.), 481 S.W.2d 231.

(1973) Held that trial by jury cannot be waived by informal statement by counsel that jury would not be required. Randolph v. Simpson (A.), 500 S.W.2d 289.

(1976) Where defendant waived jury trial under the misunderstanding of defendant and defendant's attorney that if the trial court decided to refuse parole after submission to court on an agreed statement of facts, defendant would be given an opportunity to withdraw waiver of jury trial, the waiver was held to be not intelligently made and judgment was reversed and cause remanded. State v. Sharp (Mo.), 533 S.W.2d 601.

(1978) Held, not unconstitutional to require court to hear case without jury in magistrate court since jury trial could later be had as a matter of right in circuit court. Rice v. Lucas (Mo.), 560 S.W.2d 850.

(1996) Right to jury trial applies only to those causes of action which had that right prior to 1820. Hammons v. Ehney, 924 S.W.2d 843 (Mo.banc 1996).

­­--------

Source: Const. of 1945.

(1979) Missouri statute authorizing women to request automatic exemption from jury service violated "fair cross section" requirement of sixth amendment as applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357.

­­--------

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 17 (Amended August 5, 2014).

­­--------

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 27.

­­--------

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 9.

(1964) In appeal from action to contest county school superintendent election, dicta contained in opinion stated that if § 167.020 were construed to prohibit write-in candidates it might be violative of this section and unconstitutional. Kasten v. Guth (Mo.), 375 S.W.2d 110.

(1974) Statute requiring voter to make his ballot preference known to judge in primary election held not to violate this provision. State ex rel. McClellan v. Kirkpatrick (Mo.), 504 S.W.2d 83.

­­--------

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 21.

(1954) Contention that condemnation procedure authorized by charter of the city of St. Louis violated equal protection provision of federal constitution held waived by failure to raise same in court below. City of St. Louis v. Gruss (Mo.), 263 S.W.2d 387.

(1956) In action to condemn lands for gas storage under §§ 393.410 to 393.510, owners of lands adjoining those sought to be condemned did not have right to intervene because only damage they could suffer would result from use of condemned lands and not from condemnation. Laclede Gas Co. v. Abrahamson (Mo.), 296 S.W.2d 100.

(1956) Damage to land from water overflow which allegedly would result from highway construction ruled consequential damage, no claim for which would arise prior to infliction and claimants were therefore not aggrieved by plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of condemnation action as to them and had no right of appeal. State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. Lynch (Mo.), 297 S.W.2d 400.

(1957) Where landowner was advised by state highway department that it planned to construct highway through his property and began negotiations with him for acquisition of right-of-way, and as a result he changed his subdivision development plans, there was no "taking" or "damaging" within the constitutional provision. Hamer v. State Highway Comm. (Mo.), 304 S.W.2d 869.

(1959) Where power to take property by eminent domain exists, the condemnor may determine the location and route of the improvement and the land or easement to be taken for it. State ex rel. N.W. Electric Power Coop. v. Waggoner (A.), 319 S.W.2d 930.

(1959) Where amount of judgment for damages in condemnation suit exceeded commissioner's award which was paid into court, property owner was entitled to interest on excess. St. Louis Housing Authority v. Mafagas (Mo.), 324 S.W.2d 697.

(1959) Where city appropriated private sewer without complying with statutory procedure, its action would amount to taking private property for public use without just compensation. Gunn v. City of Versailles (A.), 330 S.W.2d 257.

(1960) This provision of the constitution requires an allowance of compensation to the landowner for the loss of the use of the amount of money by which the circuit court judgment exceeds the award of the commissioners from the time of taking or appropriation until the entry of judgment fixing the amount of damages. City of St. Louis v. Vasquez (Mo.), 341 S.W.2d 839.

(1961) Evidence held sufficient to sustain judgment against city because of injury to property resulting from discharge of sewage into stream running through such property. Lewis v. City of Potosi (A.), 348 S.W.2d 577.

(1961) A provision of an ordinance in the City of St. Louis which provided that damages should be assessed as of the date of the ordinance directing the condemnation held invalid. The date on which the money is paid into the registry of the court is the date on which the value of the property is to be fixed. City of St. Louis v. International Harvester Company (Mo.), 350 S.W.2d 782.

(1962) Highway commission had authority to condemn easement to provide a substitute location for pipelines which was necessary for interstate highway construction as the taking was for public purpose and was not in violation of Article III, § 38(a) since state received compensation in surrender of existing right-of-way. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Eakin (Mo.), 357 S.W.2d 129.

(1963) Assuming that telephone company had a certificate of convenience and necessity to serve a certain area, public service commission's orders directing another company to provide service to the area did not constitute a taking of telephone company's property in violation of this constitutional provision. State ex rel. Doniphan Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 369 S.W.2d 572.

(1963) Fact of taking of property constitutes a prima facie case thus giving rise to right to have the value determined by a jury, and although owners produced no evidence to prove value of damages, jury under proper instruction could have found damages within reasonable limits of their own experience and observation and giving of instruction which foreclosed landowners from jury determination of damages was error. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Cady (A.), 372 S.W.2d 639.

(1964) Trial court properly limited evidence and instructing as to valuation of property as of the date condemnor paid amount of commissioners' award into court and deterioration of value of property as result of announcement of proposed housing project and institution of condemnation action was not an item of just compensation within the meaning of this constitutional provision. St. Louis Housing Authority v. Barnes (Mo.), 375 S.W.2d 144.

(1964) Although metropolitan sewer district was immune to action in tort for damages resulting from negligent operation of drainage ditch, this provision of constitution is binding upon state as well as others having power of eminent domain and its self-enforcing and court suggested plaintiff might proceed under procedure known as condemnation in reverse or inverse condemnation where facts alleged in petition indicated plaintiff's property was taken (or damages) for public use. Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District (Mo.), 377 S.W.2d 348.

(1964) The admission of evidence in condemnation case by owner of land zoned for agricultural purposes as to value of land for industrial use was error in absence of showing of reasonable probability of change in zoning restriction in reasonably near future and fact that land was being taken for electric power plant did not establish reasonable probability that zoning restriction would be changed in reasonably near future to permit industrial use generally. Union Electric v. Saale (Mo.), 377 S.W.2d 427.

(1964) In proceedings to condemn property by city for construction and maintenance of sanitary sewers evidence justified finding that special benefits equalled or exceeded the damages and owners were not entitled to awards. Thomson v. Kansas City (A.), 379 S.W.2d 194.

(1967) If property is taken or damaged without agreement or legal proceedings, one of several remedies of the owner is that he may waive the tort and sue for the compensatory damages to which he would have been entitled if condemnation proceedings had been instituted prior to the entry. Twiehaus v. Wright City (Mo.), 412 S.W.2d 450.

(1967) Expenses of litigation paid by landowners before termination of of condemnation proceedings did not constitute taking or damaging of his property for public use without just compensation. Dietrich v. St. Louis County (Mo.), 415 S.W.2d 777.

(1969) Section 88.673, RSMo, does not prevent recovery of damages under Art. I, § 26, of the constitution, for private property taken or damaged for public use. Lange v. City of Jackson (A.), 440 S.W.2d 758.

(1973) This provision declared to be self-enforcing. Wells v. State Highway Commission (Mo.), 503 S.W.2d 689.

(1986) Section 64.090, RSMo, was held to violate section 26 of Article I of the Missouri Constitution insofar as it attempted to give certain counties the power to zone out existing uses of property. People Tags, Inc., v. Jackson County Legislature, 636 F.Supp. 1345 (W.D. Mo. 1986).

(1987) Eminent domain statutes are narrowly construed, and an activity conducted beyond the scope of such statute, such as a "soil survey", may be enough of an intrusion to constitute a taking. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission v. Eilers, 729 S.W.2d 471 (Mo.App. 1987).

(1993) When, as result of public works project, private property is damaged by an unreasonable diversion of surface waters, whether by design or by mistake, or when private property is damaged by nuisance operated by an entity having power of eminent domain, proper remedy is an action in inverse condemnation. Heins Implement v. Mo. Highway & Transportation Commission, 859 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. en banc).

(2000) Residents were constitutionally entitled to just compensation from sewer district in nuisance-based inverse condemnation action for odors emitted from water treatment plant. Byrom v. Little Blue Valley Sewer Dist., 16 S.W.3d 573 (Mo.banc).

(2008) Section requires availability of prejudgment interest in cases of indirect takings, either permanent or temporary, as well as in cases of direct takings. Akers v. City of Oak Grove, 246 S.W.3d 916 (Mo.banc).

­­--------

Source: Const. of 1945.

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Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 20.

(1954) Land clearance for Redevelopment Law (RSMo, Sec. 99.300 et seq.), in authorizing the acquisition of sound structures and vacant land by city does not constitute taking private property for private use. State on Inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redev. Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44.

(1954) In determining the validity of slum clearance legislation granting power of eminent domain, section 28, Article I, and section 21, Article VI, are to be construed together and as so construed a legislative finding that a blighted or insanitary area exists so as to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain is conclusive on the courts in absence of allegation and proof that the finding is arbitrary, or induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith. State on Inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44; (1954) Land Clearance for Redev. Authority v. City of St. Louis (Mo.), 270 S.W.2d 58.

(1954) Fact that owner of all of lots on one side of proposed street built homes to sell and undertook grading of street does not establish that ordinance for grading of street was not for public use. In The Matter of Proceedings to Grade North Elmwood (Mo.), 270 S.W.2d 863.

(1961) The conveyance of property acquired by eminent domain in slum clearance project to university controlled by religious denomination held not to constitute the taking of private property for private purposes. Kintzelle v. City of St. Louis (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 695.

(1962) Highway commission had authority to condemn easement to provide a substitute location for pipelines which was necessary for interstate highway construction as the taking was for public purpose and was not in violation of Article III, Sec. 38(a) since state received compensation in surrender of existing right-of-way. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Eakin (Mo.), 357 S.W.2d 129.

­­--------

Source: Const. of 1945.

(1952) Picketing, for the purpose of coercing employer to sign contract recognizing as exclusive collecting bargaining agent a labor organization of which only small minority of employees of such employer were members, was for an unlawful purpose under federal statute and therefore could be restrained without violating guaranties of constitution. Katz Drug Co. v. Kavner (Mo.) 249 S.W.2d 166.

(1955) Where evidence disclosed no reasonable objective of peaceful picketing other than to cause the employer to violate its employees' rights by coercing them into union membership it was unlawful and would be enjoined. Bellerive Country Club v. McVey, 365 Mo. 477, 284 S.W.2d 492.

(1955) Picketing to coerce employees to join certain union and to designate that union as a bargaining agent is violative of their rights under the constitution and is, therefore, unlawful. Tallman Co. v. Latal, 365 Mo. 552, 284 S.W.2d 547.

(1956) Picketing of hotel by bartenders' union for purpose of coercing management to coerce its employees to join the union and to accept the union as their bargaining representative was in violation of this section. American Hotel Co. v. Bartenders' International League of America, (Mo.), 297 S.W.2d 411.

(1957) Violation by an employer of right to organize and to bargain collectively as guaranteed by this provision is a wrong, and coercion of employees to prevent their organization should be enjoined. Quinn v. Buchanan (Mo.), 298 S.W.2d 413.

(1963) This provision does not authorize relief for employee in the nature of reinstatement and recovery of lost wages for employee who had no contract for a definite term of employment and who was allegedly discharged for union activity, but such discharge would be wrongful and employee could maintain an action for damages. Smith v. Arthur C. Baue Funeral Home (Mo.), 370 S.W.2d 249.

(2007) Section applies to public employees as well as private sector employees. Independence-Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131 (Mo. banc).

(2012) Section imposes on employers an affirmative duty to bargain collectively and, when necessary, to adopt procedures to participate in that process. Coalition of Police v. Chesterfield, 386 S.W.3d 755 (Mo.banc), (overruling Quinn v. Buchanan, 298 S.W.2d 413, Mo.banc 1957).

(2012) Duty to bargain collectively includes affirmative duty to meet and confer and negotiate in good faith. American Fed'n of Teachers v. Ledbetter, 387 S.W.3d 360 (Mo. banc).

(2019) Graduate workers of state university are employees under section.  Coalition of Graduate Workers v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 585 S.W.3d 809 (Mo.App. W.D.).

­­--------

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 13.

­­--------

Source: Const. of 1945.

­­--------

(Adopted November 3, 1992).

CROSS REFERENCE:

Bail to be allowed, when, Const. Art. I, § 20

­­--------

(Adopted August 3, 2004).

(2015) The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584.

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(Adopted November 4, 2008).

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(Adopted August 5, 2014).

(2016) Right to farm provision does not invalidate county food order ordinance duly authorized under Article VI powers.  Vimont v. Christian County Health Dept., 502 S.W.3d 718 (Mo.App.S.D.).

(2022) Medical marijuana-related activities authorized by the provisions of Article XIV are not the sort of farming and ranching practices which this amendment was meant to protect. Sarcoxie Nursery Cultivation Center, LLC v. Williams, 649 S.W.3d 127 (Mo.App.W.D.).

­­--------

(Adopted November 5, 2024)